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Prayer for Relief: Considering the
Limits of Religious Practices in the
Military
Jonathan S. Sussman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”
U.S. Const. Amend. I.
The United States military is a unique institution in that our
Supreme Court permits the Department of Defense (“DoD”) to
employ clergy, called Chaplains, as full time members of the force.
However, a non-Christian or atheist in the military might consider
whether they were cut from the wrong cloth—with frequent
prayers at public events, reverberating with the inspiration of
Christian invocations, substituting “in His name” for “in Jesus’
name,” or other such litany. The crusade mounted herein
concerns the DoD and constitutional limitations applicable to
*

M.P.A, University of Arizona, 2012; J.D., Roger Williams University School
of Law, 2009; B.A., Rutgers University, 2006. Jonathan S. Sussman served as
an active duty Captain and military attorney in the United States Air Force JAG
Corps for over four years. He also formerly served on the adjunct faculty of the
University of Arizona School of Government and Public Policy. The views
presented in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent
the views of the Department of Defense or its Components. I would like to
dedicate this Article to Captain Douglas Newborn, USAF. While he was one of
my staunchest critics, he did so as one of my greatest supporters. If he and I can
balance each other out, the military can balance the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses. Direct questions and comments to jsussman18@gmail.com.
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religious practices in the military, with an emphasis on the
Chaplaincy and public prayer. Even with consideration of the
constitutionality of the Chaplaincy, common religious practices in
the military appear to run afoul of both DoD regulations and
constitutional case law. These include prayers at nonreligious,
mandatory events, particularly when they are recurring, as well
as unit pressure, particularly from leadership, to adopt religion or
religious activities.
The First Amendment is the primary guidance for
determining a formative stance on the appropriate separation of
church and state.1 There are two clauses in the First Amendment
that provide the legal analysis for determining the
constitutionality of religious activities in the public sector, the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.2 The former
forbids government endorsement of religion, and the latter forbids
the government from infringing on an individual’s personal
practice of his or her religion.3 While there is much debate over
the founders’ intentions for the balance between the religion
clauses in the Constitution4—if a singular objective can even be
gleaned—the Supreme Court has developed significant
jurisprudence on the matter.5 Though waxing and waning, these
cases ultimately set the outermost boundaries for what role
religion can play in the federal government.
One thing is for certain, the greatest threat to a realistic
discussion of this issue is the continued misbranding of the
debate. It is not about freedom of religion in the military.
Consider the following quote to illustrate this common failure to
properly frame the question. In response to the DoD’s meeting
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., John W. Whitehead, The Conservative Supreme Court and
the Demise of the Free Exercise of Religion, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1,
73, 79–84 (1997); Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Establishment Clause of First Amendment—U.S. Supreme
Court Cases, 15 A.L.R. FED. 2d 573, 585 (2007).
5. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530
U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Cnty. of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S.
Ct. 1811 (2014); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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with Michael Weinstein, an admittedly provocative critic of
religious practices in the military, Tom Perkins of the Family
Research Council stated, “[w]hy would military leadership be
meeting with one of the most rabid atheists in America to discuss
religious freedom in the military[?]”6 Mr. Weinstein’s positions
aside, the answer to Mr. Perkins question is, of course, atheists,
rabid, or otherwise, have the exact same protections afforded under
the First Amendment as do religious people. The issue is not
religious freedom, but of determining the appropriate
constitutional balance between the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses. The analysis of this Article looks to determine
the parameters of this balance as follows.
Section Two begins with a review of military regulations
addressing religious practices among service members.
In
addition to DoD regulations, Air Force Instruction 1-1 (“AF 1-1”) is
used as a branch-specific example.7 While it is the clearest
direction the Air Force provides, it nevertheless falls short of an
applicable guide.
While AF 1-1 was intended to mitigate
questionable religious practices, even read in a light most
constitutionally favorable, this document may well fail the
requirements of the First Amendment.
Section Three reviews applicable case law. The review begins
with the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman—the leading case on the
religious clauses of the First Amendment—where the Supreme
Court established the Lemon test.8 While Establishment Clause
cases have inspired some legal scholars to believe that the Lemon
test has been replaced,9 a deeper reading demonstrates that
Lemon remains applicable and useful.10 The following Section
6. Todd Starnes, Pentagon: Religious Proselytizing is Not Permitted,
FOX
NEWS,
http://radio.foxnews.com/toddstarnes/top-stories/pentagonreligious-proselytizing-is-not-permitted.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2014)
(quoting Tony Perkins, President, Family Research Council) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
7. U.S Air Force Instruction No. 1-1, ¶ 2.11 (2012) [hereinafter AFI 1-1],
available at http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af/publication/afi11/afi1-1.pdf.
8. 403 U.S. at 612–13.
9. See, e.g., Major (ret.) David E. Fitzkee & Captain Linell A. Letendre,
Religion in the Military: Navigating the Channel Between the Religion
Clauses, 59 A.F. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007).
10. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 587; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620–21; see also
Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003) (applying the Lemon
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outlines the strict scrutiny standard of review applied in free
exercise cases, focusing on Sherbert v. Verner.11 Next the Article
reviews Katcoff v. Marsh, the preeminent case on the
constitutionality of the military Chaplaincy.12 There, the Second
Circuit found that the Chaplaincy was constitutional insofar as its
activities served the compelling interest of religious
accommodation only where no alternative method of
accommodation was available.13 Indeed, the Supreme Court
remanded the case to determine whether certain military
installations actually required religious accommodation funded by
the government in areas where civilian religious establishments
were available.14
Next, the Article progresses into a judicial review of public
prayer in the forum from which most of the relevant case law has
developed, schools. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
prayer in primary and secondary education institutions poses a
potentially high risk of coercion,15 and the nondenominational
nature of prayer is irrelevant in this determination as such
activity is inherently unconstitutional.16 Further, at least by the
language of the courts, the prohibitions utilized in primary and
secondary education institutions are not limited to these forums.17
In the post-secondary educational forum, the Fourth Circuit, in
Mellen v. Bunting, determined that military colleges suffer similar
coercive issues with school-sponsored prayer as did the
aforementioned schools.18 The one limited exception to the
prohibition on government sponsored religious activity is found in
legislative prayer.19
Section Four reviews religious activity using free speech
criteria and “treating the endorsement test as a refinement of Lemon’s second
prong” (emphasis added)).
11. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
12. 755 F.2d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 1985).
13. Id. at 237.
14. Id. at 238.
15. Lee, 505 U.S. at 586–87.
16. Id. at 610; see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 224–25 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
17. See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 368 (4th Cir. 2003).
18. Id. at 371; accord Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 295–96 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
19. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014); Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983).
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analysis, focusing on Widmar v. Vincent, the major case on the
topic.20 This case clarified that by permitting general access to a
facility, a school creates an open forum that cannot be limited as
to content without a compelling government interest.21 This
Section also addresses Greer v. Spock, the case which clarified
that a military base is not a public forum.22 By analogy, Section
Three addresses another area where speech has seen major
restriction by the military and federal government, political
speech.23
Section Five reviews why coercion is an inherent part of the
military, which magnifies the need for special care in determining
appropriate religious activity. This analysis considers the purpose
underlying Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(“UCMJ”)24 and revisits the reasoning of Mellen.25
Section Six applies the case law to military prayer. The
analysis then extends into more opaque hypothetical situations,
many based upon current military activities. These activities
include proselytizing at work and military media outlets
encouraging spiritual activity.
This Article poses a large number of questions, some
rhetorical, some actual. While this Article’s thesis is that the
military is vulnerable to successful legal action in the future, the
constitutionally permissible religious activities of the military

20. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
21. Id. at 269–70.
22. 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
23. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (“When
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials
should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”); Pickering
v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (“[A] teacher’s exercise of his right to
speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his
dismissal from public employment.”); see also The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 7321–7326 (2012) (regulating the political activities of government
employees);U.S. Department of Defense Directive No. 1344.10 (2008)
[hereinafter DoD Dir. 1344.10], available at http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/
defense_ethics/ethics_regulation/1344-10.html (providing DoD “policies on
political activities of members of the Armed Forces”).
24. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2012) (prohibiting
compulsory self-incrimination in the military).
25. 327 F.3d 355, 371–72 (4th Cir. 2003).
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have not yet been squarely addressed.26
Therefore, these
questions serve to highlight the complexity and, in some cases, the
severity of the issue of religious practices in the military.
II. CURRENT STATUS OF THE DOD ON RELIGIOUS PRACTICES

Before addressing the constitutional questions, this Section
addresses the current military regulations on both the Chaplaincy
and military prayer. The takeaway, in most cases, is that the
regulations are vague at best. Further, many of these regulations,
at the least, skirt the constitutional line and may cross it.
Department of Defense Directive 1304.19 lists the purposes of
the Chaplaincy.27 The regulation explains that the function of the
Chaplaincy is to: (1) “advise and assist commanders in the
discharge of their responsibilities”; (2) “provide for the free
exercise of religion in the context of military service as guaranteed
by the Constitution”; (3) “assist commanders in managing
Religious Affairs”; and (4) “serve as the principal advisors to
commanders for all issues regarding the impact of religion on
military operations.”28 While it is unclear from the regulation
whether the list is exhaustive, in actuality some practices of the
military Chaplaincy extend past these primary duties.
To use the Air Force as an example, AF 1-1 gives some advice
on the general application of religious practices in the military.29
Paragraph 2.11 explains:
Leaders at all levels must balance constitutional
protections for an individual’s free exercise of religion or
other personal beliefs and the constitutional prohibition
against governmental establishment of religion. For
example, they must avoid the actual or apparent use of
26. For an excellent review of grievances filed against the military thus
far, as well as a platform for a successful suit against the military, see Jeffrey
Lakin, Note, Atheists in Foxholes: Examining the Current State of Religious
Freedom in the United States Military, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 713, 735–36
(2011).
27. See U.S. Department of Defense Directive No. 1304.19, ¶ 4.1 (2004)
[hereinafter DoD Dir. 1304.19], available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/
directives/corres/pdf/130419p.pdf; accord U.S Air Force Instruction No. 52101 (2013), available at http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_hc/
publication/afi52-101/afi52-101.pdf.
28. See DoD Dir. 1304.19, supra note 27, ¶ 4.1.
29. AFI 1-1, supra note 7, ¶ 2.11.
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their position to promote their personal religious beliefs
to their subordinates or to extend preferential treatment
for any religion.30
Note, the first line of the paragraph identifies two protections:
(1) “an individual’s free exercise of religion” and (2) “other
personal beliefs.”31 What are these “other personal beliefs”? The
next sentence does not clarify, but provides, what appears to be,
nonexclusive examples of what leaders are prohibited from
doing.32
Leaders are prohibited from: (1) promoting “their
personal religious beliefs” or (2) giving “preferential treatment for
any religion.”33 To determine what is meant by “other personal
beliefs,” a starting point might be to ask the following questions:
to an atheist, wouldn’t even a nondenominational prayer promote
a leader’s personal religious beliefs? Indeed, would it not show
favoritism to the faithful over nonreligious? Isn’t it possible that
“other personal beliefs,” includes—and perhaps refers directly to—
a lack of religious belief, particularly as juxtaposed with the prior
language which accounts for religious personnels’ “free exercise of
religion?”
Taking the analysis one step further, doesn’t a
nondenominational prayer appear to show military preference for
Christianity when conducted at a public military event by a
Christian Chaplain, in a fashion typically affiliated with Christian
invocations, at the behest of the base commander or other high
ranking official?
Consider the language of the Air Force’s 2006 Revised Interim
Guidelines Concerning Free Exercise of Religion in the Air Force:
Voluntary participation in worship, prayer, study, and
discussion is integral to the free exercise of religion.
Nothing in this guidance should be understood to limit
the substance of voluntary discussions of religion, or the
exercise of free speech, where it is reasonably clear that
the discussions are personal, not official, and they can be
reasonably free of the potential for, or appearance of,
coercion.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Public prayer should not imply Government endorsement
of religion and should not usually be part of routine
official business. Mutual respect and common sense
should always be applied, including consideration of
unusual circumstances and the needs of the command.
Further, non-denominational, inclusive prayer or a
moment of silence may be appropriate for military
ceremonies of special importance when its primary
purpose is not the advancement of religious beliefs.
Military chaplains are trained in these matters.34
An inartful drafting begs the question, is it the ceremony that
cannot have the primary purpose of advancing religion or the
prayer that cannot have the primary purpose of advancing
religion? With regard to the former reading of the regulation, the
sheer presence of the Chaplain during such an event demonstrates
its religious nature. If the prayer itself does not make the event
primarily religious, at what point is that threshold met? The next
question is, what are “military ceremonies of special
importance”?35
Are they Military Developmental Education
graduations, base-sponsored remembrances, or monthly base
readiness runs? Regarding the latter reading of the regulation,
when would even a nondenominational prayer ever have a
primary purpose that was not to advance religious beliefs,
particularly if conducted by a Chaplain? Perhaps a secular appeal
for good tidings might have that purpose, but then why use
federal funds to pay a Chaplain for that purpose? Realistically, no
“prayers” are secularized, frequently concluding with “in His
name” or other directly religious references.
Even if the
regulation is deemed to permit prayers at most Air Force events,
this does not guarantee its constitutionality. Indeed, it is likely
the Supreme Court would take issue with some of these practices.
To expound, this analysis continues with the case law on the
religion clauses.

34. Memorandum from the Sec’y, Air Force & the Chief-of-Staff, Air
Force to All Major Commands on Revised Interim Guidelines Concerning
Free Exercise of Religion in the Air Force (Feb. 9, 2006).
35. Id.
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III. THE RELIGION CLAUSES

The Establishment Clause, as previously addressed, has been
interpreted to prohibit a certain intermingling of government and
religion, whereas the Free Exercise Clause guarantees the ability
of the populace to engage in religious practices free of government
intervention.36 Determining which clause forms the basis of a
court’s analysis depends on whether religious activity is
undertaken by a government actor (Establishment) or prohibited
by a government actor (Free Exercise).37 The former requires
application of what the Supreme Court has entitled the Lemon
test.38 The latter requires the application of the strict scrutiny
test where a government action is not religiously neutral.39
A. The Establishment Clause: The Lemon Test
The Court’s decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman stemmed from
constitutional challenges to state government aid that was being
given to Rhode Island and Pennsylvania private, religious schools
to be used for secular subjects.40 In a stunning example of what
must be termed puritan modesty, the Court explained the
ambiguous line between the religion clauses, stating, “we can only
dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily
sensitive area of constitutional law.”41 The Court further stated,
“[t]he language of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is
36. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–77 (1990) (“The free exercise of religion
means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious
doctrine one desires. Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes all
‘governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.’” (quoting Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963))), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012), as recognized in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
37. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401,
1410 (7th Cir. 1991).
38. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
39. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876–82; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402–03.
40. 403 U.S. at 606–07. In particular, Pennsylvania reimbursed the
schools for the cost of salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for
teachers that taught secular subjects. Id. Rhode Island paid a fifteen
percent salary increase directly to secular teachers, bypassing the schools
completely. Id. at 607.
41. Id. at 612.
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at best opaque.”42 However, the Court elaborated, “[i]ts authors
did not simply prohibit the establishment of a state church or a
state religion . . . Instead they commanded that there should be no
law respecting an establishment of religion.”43 The Court noted:
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous
or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations
of our democratic system of government, but political
division along religious lines was one of the principal
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to
protect.44
Based upon this analysis, the Court held that three particular
government actions were prohibited, “sponsorship, financial
support and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity.”45 In deeming the two state statutes unconstitutional,
the Court explained that the appropriate test for determining a
permissible law challenged under the Establishment Clause is: (1)
if the law has a secular purpose;46 (2) if its principle or primary
effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) if it does not
foster excessive government entanglement with religion.47
Indeed, the Court explained that the more people that are served
by programs of this nature, the greater the offense to the
Establishment Clause, as political division would ensue.48
The argument has been made that there are independent
legal tests, separate from Lemon, upon which the Supreme Court
has relied.49 This is unsurprising as the majority in Lemon
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
44. Id. at 622.
45. Id. at 612 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668
(1970)).
46. Later case law clarified that, in order to satisfy the “purpose”
element, one must look at the statute through the lens of an “objective
observer.” See Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 9; see also Harris v. City
of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1411–14 (7th Cir. 1991). As such, the court must be
able to conceive a secular purpose such as education, health, or safety. See
id. at 1411. If there are multiple purposes, the primary purpose must be
secular. See Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 9.
47. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.
48. Id. at 622.
49. See, e.g., Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 11; see also Mellen v.
Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370–71 (4th Cir. 2003).
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referred to the elements of the Lemon test independently as three
tests.50 An article offered that the Supreme Court has established
a separate “endorsement test,” citing County of Allegheny v.
ACLU.51 In Allegheny, the Court prohibited a crèche on public
property, which read, “[g]lory to God for the birth of Jesus
Christ.”52 The theory behind the two authors’ contention is that
in order to violate the Constitution, a law must actually and
directly endorse religion.53 However, the Court in Allegheny
explicitly references the Lemon test, and it only indicates that
“[i]n recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to
whether the challenged governmental practice either has the
purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion, a concern that has long
had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”54 The
Court does not discount Lemon, but clarifies that “despite
divergence at the bottom line, . . . the government’s use of
religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of
endorsing religious beliefs.”55 In other words, at the least, the
Establishment Clause is violated by government endorsement of
religion. An actual endorsement test is only derived from Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in Allegheny.56 Indeed later courts saw
the endorsement test simply as a refinement of the second prong
of the Lemon test.57
The aforementioned article also referenced a “coercion test,”
which it derived from Lee v. Weisman.58 Dealt with in greater
detail below, the claimant in Lee sought to enjoin a rabbi from
providing a nondenominational prayer at a public school
graduation ceremony.59
The Court found the activity
unconstitutional due to the quasi-obligatory nature of a

50. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13
51. Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 11 (citing Cnty. of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989)).
52. 492 U.S. at 599–602.
53. Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 11–12.
54. 492 U.S. at 592.
55. Id. at 597.
56. Id. at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
57. See, e.g., Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003).
58. Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 11–12 (citing Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)).
59. 505 U.S. at 583–84.
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graduation ceremony.60 According to proponents of the coercion
test, “[t]he Court in Lee specifically declined to reconsider the
Lemon test and instead used the coercion analysis to strike down
the prayer.”61 To clarify, the Court in Lee appears to only be
remarking that it would not reconsider the Lemon test in order to
overrule Lemon, as requested by the petitioner in the case.62 The
intent was not to discount the Lemon test, but to acknowledge the
violation in Lee to be so flagrant as to fail even the limited
requirement that, “at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees
that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do
so.’”63 The nomenclature of the coercion test, once again, appears
to derive from Justice O’Connor’s concurrences.64
The Supreme Court has made a firmer constitutional front
against certain extreme instances of government religious activity,
resulting in alternate tests being derived. However, the Lemon
test is still alive and well.
B. Free Exercise
Free exercise has also gleaned multiple tests. In Reynolds v.
United States, the court reviewed a conviction against a member
of the Mormon faith who violated the anti-bigamy laws in taking a
second wife.65 The defendant challenged the law on free exercise
grounds.66 The Court explained that even the founding of the
United States saw constitutional protections inapplicable in
instances “in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order.”67 The Court, therefore, upheld the conviction on the basis
60. Id. at 586.
61. Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 11 n.66; see also Mellen, 327
F.3d at 370.
62. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
63. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
64. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 628–29 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment), abrogated by Town of
Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 44 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
65. 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878).
66. Id. at 161–62.
67. Id. at 164.
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that from its founding, polygamy was not deemed protected under
the Free Exercise Clause.68 The Court further explained the
ramifications of allowing practices such as polygamy.69
It
explained that convicting citizens for polygamy who do so for
religious purposes versus secular purposes introduced a new
element to criminal law.70 Further, allowing polygamy for
religious purposes promised a slippery slope of protection for
religious practices of even greater public concern, such as human
sacrifice.71 This case, while beginning the analysis, does not
provide an easily applicable rule for future cases.72
The Court in Sherbert v. Verner provided the modern
standard for most free exercise jurisprudence.73 The case involved
the denial of unemployment benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist
Church member who was fired for the inability to work on
Saturdays, which was part of her religious obligation.74 The law
allowed employers to preclude benefits from individuals who
refused suitable work provided by the employer, and the state
found that failure to accept work on Saturday fell under this
preclusion.75 The Court reversed the state’s decision explaining
that the petitioner’s religious beliefs were not that which “posed
some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order,” and the
state provided no compelling government interest to justify the
prohibition.76 The Court explained, “‘[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible
limitation.’”77 In explaining how this burden is met by a party,
the Court used the example of Sunday closing laws—which put
68. Id. at 165.
69. Id. at 166.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
906 (1990) (holding that Oregon could deny unemployment benefits to
members of the Native American church who ingested peyote in violation of a
generally applicable law against peyote, even without a compelling
government interest), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4, as recognized in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
73. 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963); cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876–82.
74. Id. at 399–400.
75. Id. at 401.
76. Id. at 402–03.
77. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
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Jewish merchants who could not work on Saturday at a
disadvantage—as satisfying a strong state interest in a rest day
for all workers.78
C. The Religion Clauses and the Military Chaplaincy
The Chaplaincy is a regular installment at many military
events, frequently beginning events with a nondenominational
invocation.
Courts have found the Chaplaincy to be
constitutional, but only for specific purposes.79 In Katcoff v.
Marsh, the Second Circuit reviewed a case that involved a
constitutional challenge brought by two law students, claiming
that the Army Chaplaincy was an unconstitutional violation of the
Establishment Clause.80 The Second Circuit explained that there
is a long history of the Chaplaincy in the military.81 Further, the
fact that the military sends troops outside of their home
environments, subject to deadly circumstances, necessitates
Chaplains that can move with the military in order to satisfy their
rights under the Free Exercise Clause.82 The court noted, “[t]he
chaplain’s principal duties are to conduct religious services
(including periodic worship, baptisms, marriages, funerals and the
like), to furnish religious education to soldiers and their families,
and to counsel soldiers with respect to a wide variety of personal
problems.”83 The court reiterated its formula, explaining:
The government must be neutral when it comes to
competition between sects. It may not thrust any sect on
any person. It may not make a religious observance
compulsory. It may not coerce anyone to attend church, to
observe a religious holiday, or to take religious

78. Id. at 408 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961)). It is
interesting that the Court uses “Blue Laws” as an example of a sufficient,
compelling government interest. The preceding paragraph described the
requirement that a limitation on free speech must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest; yet, a law requiring employees
receive any one day a week off could accomplish the same goal without
unduly impacting individuals unable to work on Saturday.
79. See, e.g., Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 1985).
80. Id. at 224–25.
81. Id. at 225.
82. Id. at 228, 232.
83. Id. at 228.
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instruction.84
The court continued:
Since the program meets the requirement of
voluntariness by leaving the practice of religion solely to
the individual soldier, who is free to worship or not as he
chooses without fear of any discipline or stigma, it might
be viewed as not proscribed by the Establishment
Clause.85
The court elaborated that, looking at the Chaplaincy
according to the Lemon test, on its face it appeared
unconstitutional.86 However, looked at in light of the War Powers
and Free Exercise Clauses, the opposite conclusion was reached.87
Further:
The purpose and effect of the program is to make religion,
religious education, counseling and religious facilities
available to military personnel and their families under
circumstances where the practice of religion would
otherwise be denied as a practical matter to all or a
substantial number.88
Note however, that the court did not contend that the ability of
the clergy to engage in religious activity under the Free Exercise
Clause was absolute:
If the ability of such personnel to worship in their own
communities is not inhibited by their military service and
funds for these chaplains and facilities would not
otherwise be expended, the justification for a
governmental program of religious support for them is
questionable and, notwithstanding our deference to
Congress in military matters, requires a showing that
they are relevant to and reasonably necessary for the
conduct of our national defense by the Army.89
84. Id. at 231 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. at 231–32.
86. Id. at 232.
87. Id. at 234–35.
88. Id. at 237.
89. Id. at 238.
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The court ultimately determined that the Chaplaincy is
constitutional in certain circumstances, limited to what is
necessary to provide for the accommodation of military members’
free exercise when those members are deprived of access to clergy
due to military service.90 Indeed, based upon the court’s limited
holding, the case was remanded to determine whether Chaplaincy
programs were required in busy, urban areas where civilian
religious establishments are available.91
D. Engel v. Vitale and Progeny: Public Prayer
In Katcoff, the Second Circuit held that the use of the
Chaplaincy for limited purposes is constitutional.92 While this
could easily serve to satisfy the issue, it fails to address public
prayers at military events. Without dispositive rulings, analysis
of this issue must be derived from persuasive case law. While not
in the active duty military context, the issue has been addressed
with regard to public schools.
Engel v. Vitale, involved a New York public school system that
directed each class to recite the prayer on a daily basis,
“[a]lmighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and
we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our
Country.”93 The policy permitted those who were not interested to
refrain or leave the room.94 The Supreme Court held, “[t]here can,
of course, be no doubt that New York’s program of daily classroom
invocation of God’s blessings as prescribed in the Regents’ prayer
is a religious activity. It is a solemn avowal of divine faith and
supplication for the blessings of the Almighty.”95 In finding this
prayer unconstitutional, the Court explained:
[T]he constitutional prohibition against laws respecting
an establishment of religion must at least mean that in
this country it is no part of the business of government to
compose official prayers for any group of the American
people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on
by government. It is a matter of history that this very
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 237–38.
Id. at 238.
Id.
370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962).
Id. at 430.
Id. at 424.

SUSSMANFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

2/5/2015 3:25 PM

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

91

practice of establishing governmentally composed prayers
for religious services was one of the reasons which caused
many of our early colonists to leave England and seek
religious freedom in America.96
In response to the argument that the prayer’s nondenominational
nature rendered it harmless to the Establishment Clause, the
Court wrote:
The respondents’ argument to the contrary, which is
largely based upon the contention that the Regents’
prayer is ‘nondenominational’ and the fact that the
program, as modified and approved by state courts, does
not require all pupils to recite the prayer but permits
those who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused
from the room, ignores the essential nature of the
program’s constitutional defects. Neither the fact that the
prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that
its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can
serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment
Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause.97
In other words, neither the nondenominational nature of a
prayer, nor the voluntariness of the prayer may be considered in
determining the constitutionality of government sponsored prayer.
Justice Douglas adds another layer of analysis in his concurring
opinion.98 Of interest however, Justice Douglas frames the issue
in terms of the finance of religious exercise.99 According to Justice
Douglas, the issue would be uncomplicated following the
longstanding view of the Supreme Court that the government
remain neutral to religion100—but for Everson v. Board of
Education, which permits funding for bus transportation to
students attending parochial schools.101 Both concurring with the
majority in Engel and disagreeing in dicta with the Everson
decision, he explains that practices like those in the current case
96. Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 430 (emphasis added); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
98. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 437–44 (Douglas, J., concurring).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 443–44.
101. 330 U.S. 1, 26 (1947) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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are impermissible in any publicly funded forum.102
So as to ensure there is no confusion, the ruling in Engel has
not been limited to daily prayers.103 Courts have applied the
same standard to nonsectarian prayers conducted annually at
graduations.104 In Lee, briefly discussed above, a student and
parent filed for injunctive relief following a failed attempt to
prohibit a rabbi from providing a nondenominational prayer at the
student’s graduation ceremony.105 The Court noted the quasi102. Engel, 370 U.S. at 437–44 (Douglas, J., concurring).
103. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 313 (2000);
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992).
104. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 590.
105. Id. at 580–81. Note the sectarian language of the prayers in this
case:
INVOCATION
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the
rights of minorities are protected, we thank You. May these
young men and women grow up to enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You.
graduates grow up to guard it.

May these new

For the political process of America in which all its citizens may
participate, for its court system where all may seek justice we
thank You. May those we honor this morning always turn to it
in trust.
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of
Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to
share it.
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people,
who are our hope for the future, be richly fulfilled.
AMEN
BENEDICTION
O God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the
capacity for learning which we have celebrated on this joyous
commencement.
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an
important milestone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers
and administrators who helped prepare them.
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obligatory nature of graduation ceremonies, despite attendance
not being required to receive a diploma.106 It explained:
The government involvement with religious activity in
this case is pervasive, to the point of creating a statesponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public
school. Conducting this formal religious observance
conflicts with settled rules pertaining to prayer exercises
for students, and that suffices to determine the question
before us.
The principle that government may
accommodate the free exercise of religion does not
supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the
Establishment Clause.107
The Supreme Court has made clear that accommodation under the
Free Exercise Clause is not a proper basis for such a program in
the face of the Establishment Clause’s limitations.108 In an
explanation rivaled only by the poetry of the Psalms, Justice
Kennedy wrote:
We are asked to recognize the existence of a practice of
nonsectarian prayer, prayer within the embrace of what
is known as the Judeo–Christian tradition, prayer which
is more acceptable than one which, for example, makes
explicit references to the God of Israel, or to Jesus Christ,
or to a patron saint. There may be some support, as an
empirical observation, to the statement of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, picked up by Judge
Campbell’s dissent in the Court of Appeals in this case,

The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future,
help them to understand that we are not complete with
academic knowledge alone. We must each strive to fulfill what
You require of us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to walk
humbly.
We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us
and allowing us to reach this special, happy occasion.
AMEN
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. at 586.
107. Id. at 587.
108. See id.
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that there has emerged in this country a civic religion,
one which is tolerated when sectarian exercises are
not. . . . If common ground can be defined which permits
once conflicting faiths to express the shared conviction
that there is an ethic and a morality which transcend
human invention, the sense of community and purpose
sought by all decent societies might be advanced. But
though the First Amendment does not allow the
government to stifle prayers which aspire to these ends,
neither does it permit the government to undertake that
task for itself.109
Once again, the sectarian nature of the prayer was irrelevant
to the Court’s calculus.110 In a similar vein, Justice Souter’s
concurring opinion explained that the Establishment Clause is
equally applicable to acts favoring religion generally as it is to acts
favoring one religion over another.111
Thus, constitutionality is not contingent on the frequency of
the prayer at issue. Further, even entirely voluntary graduation
ceremonies remain impermissible forums for school prayer.
Finally, according to Justice Souter, the Establishment Clause,
more than even requiring diversity of religious views, requires
neutrality of religious views.112
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court
extended the prohibition even further—to entirely non-mandatory,
after-school events.113 In Santa Fe, the Court prohibited studentinitiated and led prayer at football games.114 While the Court
accepts the notion that there is a distinction between public and
private speech, they nevertheless find that the invocations at
issue were “authorized by a government policy and take place on
government property at government-sponsored school-related
events,” such that no defense of private speech existed.115

109. Id. at 589.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 609–10 (Souter, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 610, 617–18; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment teaches that a government
neutral in the field of religion better serves all religious interests.”).
113. 530 U.S. 290, 310 (2000).
114. Id. at 301.
115. Id. at 302–03.
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Therefore, at least in the school context, though the language is
not nearly so narrow, religious activity sponsored by a government
entity, even at entirely extracurricular events and requested by
the students themselves, is unconstitutional.
The preceding two decisions serve predominantly to readjudicate conclusions already reached in Engel. Nevertheless, to
acknowledge the opposing position, consider the following.
Although the Court extended the Establishment Clause
prohibition to include less regular recitation of prayers, yearly
graduations, and football games vice daily prayer, the cases
operated under a position more narrow than Engel, that
“government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise.”116 All of these cases, including Engel,
could further be read as relating to school children.117 As the
Court noted, “there are heightened concerns with protecting
freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the
elementary and secondary public schools.”118 However, the Court
never withdrew from Engel’s broader holding that the
Establishment Clause prohibits official prayers “for any group of
the American people” by an instrumentality of the government,
whether coercive or not.119 The Court in Lee later noted that,
while the concern for coercion is most pronounced in the school
context, the concern is not necessarily limited to that forum.120
Further, “[t]he First Amendment’s Religion Clauses mean that
religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be
either proscribed or prescribed by the State.”121 However broadly
or narrowly these cases are read, there is also case law, at the
post-secondary level, which discusses the coercive nature of
military institutions.
Mellen v. Bunting, a Fourth Circuit case, dealt with the
practice of prayer in a military-style institution.122 Mellen
involved a suit against the Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”) by a

116.
117.
at 422.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (emphasis added).
See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301; Lee, 505 U.S. at 581; Engel, 370 U.S.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
Engel, 370 U.S. at 425.
505 U.S. at 592.
Id. at 589.
327 F.3d 355, 360 (4th Cir. 2003).
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former cadet requesting an injunction and damages due to the
superintendent’s practice of supper prayer.123 Analyzing the case
under both the coercion analysis and Lemon test, the court issued
an injunction explaining that, “[a]lthough VMI’s cadets are not
children, in VMI’s educational system they are uniquely
susceptible to coercion. VMI’s adversative method of education
emphasizes the detailed regulation of conduct and the
indoctrination of a strict moral code.”124 The court explained that
it is joined in its contention by a case decided by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, Anderson v. Laird, which
dealt with a federal requirement for military academy students to
attend religious services on Sundays.125 Without agreeing, the
court noted that its sister circuits have held that traditional
college students suffer less coercion than grade school children, in
terms of graduation ceremonies.126 Although the court confirmed
that other circuits dealing with prayers at civilian higher
education institutions have held differently,127 there appeared to
be no cases involving military institutions that held to the
contrary. The Anderson case recognized by the court in Mellen
had similar results and, perhaps, some broader implications.128
This case involved a suit by cadets and midshipmen from West
Point, the Naval Academy, and the Air Force Academy, who
challenged rules requiring attendance at Protestant, Catholic, or
Jewish religious services on Sundays.129 Failure to attend had
punitive repercussions, including possible expulsion.130
The
schools had an exemption for conscientious objection to attendance
at services, but the court was not persuaded that this healed the
constitutional violation.131 The court noted that, insofar as a
cadet may want occasionally to pray alone, they are coerced into

123. Id. at 362–63.
124. Id. at 371.
125. Id. at 368 (citing Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 284 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
126. Id. (citing Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985–86 (7th Cir. 1997);
Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 237–38 (6th Cir. 1997)).
127. Id. (citing Tanford, 104 F.3d 982; Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d 232).
128. 466 F.2d at 283–84.
129. Id. at 284.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 293.

SUSSMANFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

2/5/2015 3:25 PM

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

97

attendance, and therefore, the action was unconstitutional.132
One may see fit to distinguish school prayer from military
prayer. We are first introduced to the federal case law that
addresses public prayer in military institutions (albeit, colleges) in
the final two district court cases of the Section.133 While not
Supreme Court cases, the focus on the unique nature of the
military academies is telling. As discussed in Section V, the
military, similar to its academies, is a coercive institution. One’s
life is restricted to a much larger extent, and one’s personal
behavior is subject to much higher scrutiny.
E. Katcoff v. Marsh and Town of Greece v. Galloway: The
Legislative Prayer Exception
A major exemption to the string of prohibitive case law on
religious practices in government deals with legislative prayer.
The major Supreme Court cases on the topic are Marsh v.
Chambers134 and Town of Greece v. Galloway.135
In Marsh, the Supreme Court upheld the Nebraska
legislature’s practice of beginning their sessions with a prayer by
a state-funded Chaplain.136 The Court was very particular to
state that it “granted certiorari limited to the challenge to the
practice of opening sessions with prayers by a State-employed
clergyman.”137 The Court focused on the fact that opening
sessions of legislative and other deliberative bodies with prayer
have long been a part of the history and tradition of the United
132. Id. at 296. In deferring to the founders, the court stressed Madison’s
“Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.” Id. at 287.
They interpreted Madison’s writings to oppose any relations between church
and state—in any form and degree—thereby interpreting the prohibitions in
the Establishment Clause as broadly as possible. Id.
133. See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 360 (4th Cir. 2003); Anderson,
466 F.2d. 283–84.
134. 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983).
135. 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1816 (2014). There have been other cases that have
found certain direct religious activity, other than prayer, permissible under
the Lemon test. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984)
(permitting a crèche in its Christmas display). But see Cnty. of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601–02 (1989) (prohibiting a crèche on public property,
mainly distinguishing it from Lynch in that it included the phrase, “Glory to
God for the birth of Jesus Christ”), abrogated by Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811.
136. 463 U.S. at 795.
137. Id. at 786.
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States.138
There is discussion in the media that a more recent case,
Town of Greece v. Galloway, paves the way to more religion in
government.139 However, a review of the case demonstrates it
simply extends the preexisting, narrow exemption of Marsh. The
case involved multiple attendants of town hall meetings who
objected to the use of sectarian invocations.140 The attendants
requested an injunction limiting prayers to nonsectarian
material.141 Of even greater a constitutional concern than Marsh,
the content of the invocation typically invoked Jesus.142 If we
recall his poetic benediction in Lee, Justice Kennedy staunchly
refused to entertain the government undertaking the task of even
nonsectarian prayer.143 He posed a far different theory here.144
To defer to the media’s assertions regarding this case, Justice
Kennedy, who spoke for the majority, stated, in inexplicable
contrast to Lee,
To hold that invocations must be nonsectarian would
force the legislatures that sponsor prayers and the courts
that are asked to decide these cases to act as supervisors
and censors of religious speech, a rule that would involve
138. Id. Lee, described above, makes reference to Marsh, distinguishing it
from the public school context because of the greater ability of legislators to
“enter and leave with little comment.” 505 U.S. 577, 596–97 (1992).
139. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Let Us Pray, SLATE (May 5, 2014, 6:05
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/05/
town_of_greece_v_galloway_the_supreme_court_upholds_sectarian
_prayer_at.html.
140. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1817.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1816. The Court notes that invocations typically included the
following language:
Lord we ask you to send your spirit of servanthood upon all of us
gathered here this evening to do your work for the benefit of all in
our community. We ask you to bless our elected and appointed
officials so they may deliberate with wisdom and act with courage.
Bless the members of our community who come here to speak before
the board so they may state their cause with honesty and
humility. . . . Lord we ask you to bless us all, that everything we do
here tonight will move you to welcome us one day into your kingdom
as good and faithful servants. We ask this in the name of our
brother Jesus. Amen.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 588–89.
144. See Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1822.
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government in religious matters to a far greater degree
than is the case under the town’s current practice of
neither editing or approving prayers in advance nor
criticizing their content after the fact.145
The definitive language of the case is that “[a]bsent a pattern of
prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an
impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on
the content of a prayer will not likely establish a constitutional
violation.”146
The Court limited the scope of the case on the following facts,
“[town] leaders maintained that a minister or layperson of any
persuasion, including an atheist, could give the invocation.”147
Indeed, the predomination of Christian prayer reflected only the
predominantly Christian identity of the town’s congregations from
which the Chaplains came.148
One would be naïve to imply this case is helpful to the
ultimate propositions of this Article. However, it is notably
distinguishable to the substance of this Article. The Court treated
Galloway like legislative prayer, as addressed in Marsh.149 Like
Marsh, the case was decided based upon the notion of a long-term
history of legislative prayer stretching back to the framing of the
Constitution.150
Seemingly making a distinction without a
difference, Justice Kennedy wrote, “Marsh must not be understood
as permitting a practice that would amount to a constitutional
violation if not for its historical foundation. The case instead
taught that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by
reference to historical practices and understandings.’”151 In sum,
145. Id. Strangely, Justice Kennedy references Lee for the proposition
that a civic religion does not avoid the Establishment Clause analysis, while
concurrently arguing that prayers that give greater deference to one religion
do not offend the Establishment Clause. Id. (“Government may not mandate
a civic religion that stifles any but the most generic reference to the sacred
any more than it may prescribe a religious orthodoxy.”). See also Lee, 505
U.S. at 590 (“The suggestion that government may establish an official or
civic religion as a means of avoiding the establishment of a religion with more
specific creeds strikes us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted.”).
146. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1824.
147. Id. at 1816.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1822; see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983).
150. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1818.
151. Id. at 1819 (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670
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Justice Kennedy explained, “Marsh stands for the proposition that
it is not necessary to define the precise boundary of the
Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific
practice is permitted.”152 While this is a concerning method of
determining constitutionality, it nevertheless appears to limit the
holding to cases involving legislative prayer. The Court also
makes relevant that the principal audience for the invocations is
the lawmakers themselves, not the other attendants at the
meeting, negating the issue of coercion.153
The majority
explained, “[t]he analysis would be different if town board
members directed the public to participate in the prayers, singled
out dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that their decisions
might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer
opportunity.”154 The Court further distinguished the case from
Lee and Santa Fe based upon the reasoning that coercion did not
exist under the circumstances of the case currently before it.155
All of that said, insofar as Galloway makes any substantive
change to the case law, it is limited and certainly gives limited aid
to the analysis of religious practices in the military.
The case law leaves a gap between the permissible religious
activity of legislative prayer and the impermissible religious
activity of prayer in primary and secondary schools, as well as
military academies. This creates the question as to whether the

(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
152. Id. While the author is not opposed to constitutional interpretation
by reference to the founding of the United States, it is concerning that a legal
position bases constitutionality on its long-term application. Indeed, slavery
was deemed consistent with our Constitution by many of our founders; yet,
the impermissibility of its savage disregard for the human condition extended
well prior. In other words, our founding was rife with universally understood
immorality, and errors made for centuries do not unilaterally become legal.
Furthermore, to imply a reading of the Constitution which utilizes only the
beliefs of the Founding Fathers has two additional glaring incongruities—the
Founding Fathers rarely agreed on any one interpretation of any one article
or amendment (for example, many of them believed in the illegality of slavery
upon drafting the Constitution) and further, the likelihood that the Founding
Fathers could ever have conceived of a world like the one in which we now
live. Would they think differently about the Establishment Clause with
regard to legislative prayer had they not all been Christian?
153. Id. at 1825.
154. Id. at 1826.
155. Id. at 1827 (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
312 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592–94 (1992)).
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broad prohibition described in Engel is the proper one in contexts
outside of legislative sessions. That is, is the legislative context
unique, or is the school context unique? Considering that the
language of Engel is still good law, it appears more likely the
former is true.
Further, case law following Marsh has
significantly limited its scope.156
In Allegheny, the Court
explained, “[i]n Marsh, the Court relied specifically on the fact
that Congress authorized legislative prayer at the same time that
it produced the Bill of Rights.”157 Further, Justice Blackmun’s
concurrence in Lee notes, citing Engel and School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, “it is not enough that the
government refrain from compelling religious practices: It must
not engage in them either.”158 Without a declaration, the
concurrence in Lee appears to have recommended overruling
Marsh.159 One might also consider Justice Scalia’s treatment of
Marsh in his concurrence in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District, where he said, “when we wish to
uphold a practice it [the Lemon test] forbids, we ignore it [the
Lemon test] entirely.”160
A valid question might be, are military members more like
legislators or students? Anyone who has ever served could far
more easily analogize the military hierarchy with the latter. This
will be addressed in more detail below in Section V. In any case,
even some writers, who are more forgiving of religious practices in
the military, caution against the use of prayer at military
events.161 If the analysis of this Article were limited solely to this,
the proposition would be that it is only a matter of time before a
military member successfully brings the DoD to task on this very
issue.162 A preemptive decision to appropriately apply the limited
156. See, e.g., Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1819; Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 319–20;
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603.
157. 492 U.S. at 602.
158. 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Sch. Dist. of
Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)).
159. See id.
160. 508 U.S 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
161. See, e.g., Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 44–45.
162. See Lakin, supra note 26, 735–37 (discussing existing cases on the
topic).
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functions of the Chaplaincy and eliminate public prayer could
avoid that inevitability.
IV. FREE SPEECH

Some would argue that public prayer and religious speech are
simple freedom of speech issues.163 The relevant Free Speech
Clause standard is as follows: in a public forum—a publicly
funded place which traditionally permits a wide range of speech
on any topic164—a law, policy, or government employee acting in
their official capacity may not limit the free exchange of thought
based upon its content without a “compelling state interest.”165
This is referred to as the strict scrutiny standard, similar to the
test employed in free exercise cases. Is this right? Does one
simply apply content-based, speech analysis to prohibiting
religious speech in the military workplace? The answer lies in the
Supreme Court case of Widmar v. Vincent, which used both the
Free Speech Clause and the Lemon test to determine the
constitutionality of religious speech.166
A. Widmar v. Vincent and Progeny: The Intersection of Free
Speech and Religion
While the Supreme Court has ruled on federal actions
163. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 275 (1981) (quoting
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)).
164. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983). The common example is a park, the sidewalk, etc. See id. (quoting
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). Case law has also
seen fit to address the process of turning a non-public forum into a limited or
totally public forum based upon its regular practice. See, e.g., Widmar, 454
U.S. at 267 (“Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the
University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups.
Having done so, the University has assumed an obligation to justify its
discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms.”).
165. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774–75 (2002)
(“Under the strict-scrutiny test, respondents have the burden to prove that
the announce clause is (1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state
interest.”); accord Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (“As a facially
content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, § 2–7–111(b)
must be subjected to exacting scrutiny: The State must show that the
‘regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at
45)).
166. 454 U.S. at 271–72.
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prohibiting religious activities in open forums under the Free
Speech Clause, it did so in conjunction with the Establishment
Clause’s Lemon test.167 In Widmar, the Supreme Court found it
impermissible for the University of Missouri (“UMKC”) to prohibit
religious student groups from using its facilities under a free
speech analysis.168 The Court determined that, by permitting
general access to school facilities by student groups, the school
created an open forum for use by student groups.169 By doing so,
the school obligated itself to pose no prohibition on content
without demonstrating that the restriction was narrowly tailored
to serving a compelling government interest.170
Interestingly, the Court agreed that ensuring compliance with
the Establishment Clause is indeed a compelling government
interest.171 However, the Court went on to find, recounting the
Lemon test, that the school’s prior equal access program—which
incidentally included only religious organizations—did not create
an Establishment Clause issue.172 As per Lemon’s precedent, the
Court explained that a government activity or policy does not pose
an establishment issue where it has a secular purpose, its
principal or primary impact which does not advance or inhibit
religion, and it does not create excessive government
entanglement with religion.173
However, the devil is in the details, and the Court leaves open
the possibility of running afoul of the Establishment Clause, even
in an open forum, in some cases. The Court explained, “[t]he
provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an
important index of secular effect.”174 The Court continued, “[a]t
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious groups
will dominate UMKC’s open forum, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the forum’s
‘primary effect.’”175 Therefore, if such empirical evidence was
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
(1971)).
174.
175.

See id.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 269–70 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
Id. at 270–71.
Id. at 271–72.
Id. at 271 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13
Id. at 274.
Id. at 275.
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available, the Court’s determination may have been different.
Indeed, this language mimicked the reference in Lemon that the
larger the number of people served by the program, the greater
the danger of infringing on the Establishment Clause.176
Another well-known example of the Court upholding religious
activity on government property is Lamb’s Chapel.177 There, the
Supreme Court deemed a New York law authorizing after-hours
use of school property to local organizations to the exclusion of
religious organizations unconstitutional.178 An evangelical church
filed suit following multiple denials of access to local school
district facilities after hours.179 Though the Court did not refer to
the school as an open forum as it had in Widmar, a similar
analysis was undertaken.180 Indeed, the Court explained that
insofar as the forum is opened to a certain class, the government
may restrict access to those outside of the class unless “it denies
access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he
espouses on an otherwise includible subject.”181 Any such denial
would be in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the
Constitution.182
Like Widmar, here, there was insufficient
entanglement to justify prohibition under the Establishment
Clause.183
With regard to the issues that form the basis of this Article,
the average military base is not an open forum.184 In Greer v.
Spock, a suit was brought to enjoin U.S. Army Base, Fort Dix
regulations, which prohibited political demonstrations and also
limited the distribution of literature on base without headquarters
approval.185 The Court determined that even when civilians are
entitled to free access to certain portions of a military base, the
property does not become a public forum, and therefore, the

176.
177.
178.
179.
movie.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Compare with Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
508 U.S 384, 395 (1993).
Id. at 393.
Id. at 387–89. The church wanted to broadcast a religious themed
Id.
Id. at 395; see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267.
Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394.
Id.
Id. at 395.
See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
Id. at 832.
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regulation was constitutional.186 As a result, an argument for a
free speech right to unbridled prayer or proselytization on a
military base falls short.
B. Other Limitations on Free Speech: Political Speech
Not buying that such an essential right as religious
expression could be limited? While the issue of restricting
religious speech at work has not been the topic of much Supreme
Court discussion, the prohibition on political speech, deemed the
core of freedom of speech protections, has been subject to
significant restrictions by the federal government for some
time.187 As to the importance of political speech, consider
Garrison v. Louisiana, where the Supreme Court explained,
“speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is
the essence of self-government.”188 In NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., the Court announced the proposition that speech
on public issues occupies the “highest rung of the hierarchy of
First Amendment values.”189 Moreover, the Court left no doubt in
Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Central Committee that “the First
Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech
uttered during a campaign for political office.”190
Despite being placed upon the altar, consider the political
speech restrictions the Supreme Court has permitted at the public
workplace in Connick v. Meyers.191 There, a disgruntled Assistant
District Attorney in New Orleans was fired for distributing a
questionnaire that was critical of the transfer policies and political
behavior of the office.192 Heavily relying upon Pickering v. Board
of Education,193 the Court explained that the First Amendment’s
186. Id. at 838.
187. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964).
188. Id. at 74–75.
189. 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); accord Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467
(1980).
190. 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
191. 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
192. Id. at 141.
193. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Pickering involved a suit by a teacher who
was dismissed for writing a letter to the editor of a local paper that was
critical of the school board’s use of funding. Id. at 566–67. The Court
explained that determining permissible limits on speech in public

SUSSMANFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

106 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/5/2015 3:25 PM

[Vol. 20:75

protection of the freedom of expression—that is, ensuring a
citizen’s interest in commenting on matters of public concern—
must be balanced against the state’s interest “in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.”194 In upholding the assistant DA’s dismissal, the
Court explained:
When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern
to the community, government officials should enjoy wide
latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment.
Perhaps the government employer’s
dismissal of the worker may not be fair, but ordinary
dismissals from government service which violate no
fixed tenure or applicable statute or regulation are not
subject to judicial review even if the reasons for the
dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or unreasonable.195
The Court elaborated:
When close working relationships are essential to
fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of
deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.
Furthermore, we do not see the necessity for an employer
to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption
of the office and the destruction of working relationships
is manifest before taking action.196
Finally, the Court recognized that “manner, time, and place” is a
relevant consideration.197 The majority found that providing the
employment is “a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a
citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees.” Id. at 568. The Court determined that
non-defamatory, however negligently false, statements made regarding the
operations of a school board, where the issue is of public interest, are not a
ground for dismissal, and prohibiting said speech is a violation of freedom of
speech. Id. at 572–75. Note, the protection is not limited to firing, but also
failure to rehire. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972).
194. Connick, 461 U.S. at 142.
195. Id. at 146–47.
196. Id. at 151–52.
197. Id. at 152.
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questionnaire at work and the fact that the process pulled both
the plaintiff and her coworkers away from their work leant more
credence to the government’s case.198
Continuing the review of permissible limitations on political
speech, note the ramifications of Department of Defense Directive
1344.10 (“DoD Directive 1344.10”), which puts significant
limitations on political speech among military members.199 The
directive is modeled after the Hatch Act, though ultimately more
restrictive, which applies to federal government employees.200 By
analogy, consider United Public Workers of America (CIO) v.
Mitchell, a challenge to the Hatch Act’s prohibition on federal
employees’ participation in political management and
campaigns.201 The Court found that being politically active, even
in one’s personal capacity, may be limited under the
Constitution.202
The Court explained, “it is accepted
constitutional doctrine that these fundamental human rights are
not absolutes.”203 The Court expounded upon legal bases for
prohibiting certain speech:
The evident purpose of Congress in all this class of
enactments has been to promote efficiency and integrity
in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper
discipline in the public service. Clearly such a purpose is
within the just scope of legislative power, and it is not
easy to see why the act now under consideration does not
come fairly within the legitimate means to such an
end.204
Surely though, no such prohibition could stand the test of
time. But, indeed, it has. In United States Civil Service
Commission v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, the

198. Id.
199. DoD Dir. 1344.10, supra note 23.
200. The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326 (2012).
201. 330 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1947). It is worth noting as the Court stresses
the specific facts of the case—the main petitioner was a ward executive
committeeman who was active on Election Day as a poll worker and a
paymaster for the services of other party workers. Id. at 94.
202. Id. at 94–95.
203. Id. at 95.
204. Id. at 97 (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Court reviewed a constitutional challenge to the same provision of
the Hatch Act as vague and overbroad.205 In addition to the
specifics of the case, the Court expounded that they would even
find a statute that stated the following constitutional:
[I]n plain and understandable language, the statute
forbade activities such as organizing a political party or
club; actively participating in fund-raising activities for a
partisan candidate or political party . . . initiating or
circulating a partisan nominating petition or soliciting
votes for a partisan candidate for public office; or serving
as a delegate.206
All of these legal prohibitions, the Court need not have
specified, included acting in one’s personal capacity. Therefore,
free speech restrictions are not limited to activities on the job, but
also on one’s personal time as well. While the issue has not been
addressed by the Supreme Court, DoD Directive 1344.10’s
prohibitions also include “[s]peak[ing] before a partisan political
gathering, including any gathering that promotes a partisan
political party, candidate, or cause.”207 Does this elucidation
confirm the righteousness of these rules? Of course not. However,
considering the altar upon which political speech sits, there is
reason to believe that religious practices, an area similarly
protected by the Constitution, may be subject to similar limitation
under the First Amendment as it relates to the military. It should
come as no surprise then, that proselytizing at work would likely
receive reduced free speech protection.
V. COERCION AND THE MILITARY

One of the underlying principles of this discussion is the issue
of coercion. Certainly, it appears clear that coercion is not
necessary in order to fail the Lemon test.208 Coercion, as a lone
component of Establishment Clause analysis, “fails to take
account of the numerous more subtle ways that government can
show favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message of

205.
206.
207.
208.

413 U.S. 548, 579–80 (1973).
Id. at 556.
DoD Dir. 1344.10, supra note 23, ¶ 4.1.2.5 (emphasis added).
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
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disapproval to others.”209 However, coercive practices pose so
significant an Establishment Clause violation and are so
frequently discussed in jurisprudence, that some argue there has
been a separate coercion test developed.210 The military, as
argued below, is particularly prone to the type of coercion which
precedent on religious practices by government entities sought to
curtail. Further, perhaps more than civilian institutions, coercion
and endorsement are directly linked, as the rank on a uniform
(endorsement) breeds conformity from others (coercion).211
To begin, consider the principles underlying Article 31 of the
UCMJ.212 In the civilian criminal justice system, following arrest,
or the equivalent thereof, the police must provide a rights
advisement to a suspect only when the police are questioning a
suspect.213 However, the military system requires that a subject
receive a rights advisement before being questioned by any
military member, so long as the subject is only suspected of
committing a crime, regardless of arrest or custody.214 The notion
is that the military structure is such that military members feel so
compelled to follow orders that a Miranda warning is not
sufficient to protect their 5th Amendment rights. Therefore, a
rights advisement must be provided, not upon custodial
interrogation (the civilian standard), but as soon as they are
suspected of a crime.215 This principle is not found in civilian law
enforcement. Military defense attorneys often file unlawful
command influence motions against military prosecutors,
following announcements by installation commanders to “get
tough on crime” or commercials indicating zero tolerance policies.
Article 31 embodies this inherent and undeniable aspect of
209. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627–28 (1989) (O’Connor,
J., concurring), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014).
210. See, e.g., Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 12.
211. Indeed, a close reading of Santa Fe shows that endorsement and
coercion can be interrelated. 530 U.S. 290, 310–13 (2000). There, the
majority explained that the sheer existence of prayer at a football game was
coercive. Id. at 311–12. Though individuals need not attend, peer pressure
to conform was sufficient to strip the activity of a sufficient level of
voluntariness to avoid running afoul of the Constitution. Id.
212. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2012).
213. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
214. 10 U.S.C. § 831.
215. Id.
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military life. Yet, we are willing to negate the influence of public
prayer or proselytizing at work, so long as they are not in the
chain of command? The logic is ineffable. There is simply too
much coercion inherent in the system to disregard the impact both
down and across the military rank structure.
Further, consider how the court in Mellen explained the
coercive nature found at the Virginia Military Institute identifying
that “obedience and conformity remain central tenets of the
school’s educational philosophy.”216 The terms “obedience” and
“conformity” are frequently used in describing the military
environment, and it would not be a stretch to apply a similar
description to military events. Noteworthy in particular, while
cadets are free to withdraw from their academies, a military
member is not free to withdraw from the military until the end of
their obligation.217 While cadets may be subjected to “adversative
method[s] of education,”218 military members may be ordered into
live gunfire. In no uncertain terms, ideally at the least, a superior
orders and the subordinate follows. Further, in terms of the
influence of contemporaries, superiors may be a military member’s
only human interaction, and the people one must trust to ensure
their safety. In addition to the threat of solitude for failing to
conform, compliance could mean the difference between life and
death. A military member does not remove their uniform to go to
lunch or take a smoke break. A military member does not put on
civilian clothing at the end of the day and shed the requirement to
act according to the rules, regulations, and customs of the
service—a fact that they are persistently reminded of. As
previously discussed, free expression restrictions acknowledge this
in both the civilian-federal, as well military, contexts. Why would
the religious clauses operate any differently?
VI. APPLICATION

Step one in this analysis is attribution. At what point are an
individual’s actions subject to constitutional limitation? Consider
the language found in Lee, “[a] school official, the principal,
216. 327 F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003).
217. U.S. Armed Forces, Enlistment/Reenlistment Document, available at
http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/eforms/dd0004.pdf (last visited
Oct. 28, 2014).
218. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371.
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decided that an invocation and a benediction should be given; this
is a choice attributable to the State, and from a constitutional
perspective it is as if a state statute decreed that the prayers must
occur.”219 One’s right, as an individual, to practice his religion
freely has received significant protection.220 The sovereign is not
limited to the federal “Governmental Trinity,” but extends
through the veins of subcomponents and employees, in this case
the DoD and its leadership. When one puts on his police or
military uniform or steps over the threshold of the Capitol
Building as a federal employee, he transforms into an agent of the
government. In this alter ego they are not performing in their
individual capacity, but as government actors that are subject to
the limitations of the Establishment Clause.221 What legal
scholar could argue that the actions of a base commander, unit
commander, first sergeant, or supervisor of a unit in uniform be
treated differently than the actions in Lee?
Some would argue for applying the objective observer
standard—that is derived from civilian school-prayer cases—to
the military in order to determine whether an individual is
operating as a representative of the government.222 After all, the
Supreme Court has explained, “there is a crucial difference
between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect.”223 However, the objective observer standard does not
necessarily recognize the coercion to conform, vertically and
horizontally along the chain, inherent in the military. For this
reason, the objective observer would not necessarily be the
appropriate standard to apply.
The next issue is whether religious activity as it exists in the
military today must be permitted under the Free Exercise Clause.
Air Force Academy Professor David Fitzkee wrote, “some major
world religions—notably Christianity, the largest religion in the
United States and the military—encourage their members to

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000).
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
See, e.g., Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 31.
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290 at 302.
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convert nonbelievers to their faith.”224 He further notes, “leaders
(and those complaining) must recognize that the First Amendment
protects proselytizing.”225 Some would argue that free exercise
requires permitting proselytizing in military organizations, as
mandated by many world religions.226 As the author cannot claim
the sentiment as his own, credit is given to fictional character
President Josiah Bartlet from the West Wing television show:
I’m interested in selling my youngest daughter into
slavery as sanctioned in Exodus 21:7.
She’s a
Georgetown sophomore, speaks fluent Italian, always
cleaned the table when it was her turn. What would a
good price for her be? My chief of staff, Leo McGarry,
insists on working on the Sabbath. Exodus 35:2 clearly
says he should be put to death. Am I morally obligated to
kill him myself or is it okay to call the police? Here’s one
that’s really important cause we’ve got a lot of sports fans
in this town: touching the skin of a dead pig makes one
unclean. Leviticus 11:7. If they promise to wear gloves
can the Washington Redskins still play football? Can
Notre Dame? Can West Point? Does the whole town
really have to be together to stone my brother, John, for
planting different crops side by side? Can I burn my
mother in a small family gathering for wearing garments
made from two different threads?227
Clauses of this nature are not unique to the Judeo-Christian
faith systems. Indeed many religious texts contain commands
that American society rightfully does not apply. The concern for a
veritable, carte blanche right to apply religious practices in any
forum does not belong exclusively to Hollywood and fictional
characters. Recall the explanation of the Court in Reynolds that,
if such an expansive view of the Free Exercise Clause were taken,
even human sacrifice may have to be permitted.228
224. David E. Fitzkee, Religious Speech in the Military: Freedoms and
Limitations, U.S. ARMY WAR COLL. Q. PARAMETERS, Autumn 2011, at 59, 64,
available
at
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/
Articles/2011autumn/Fitzkee.pdf.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., id.
227. West Wing: The Midterms (NBC television broadcast Oct. 18, 2000).
228. 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
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The moral to be taken is, “[t]he principle that government
may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede
the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment
Clause.”229 There is a certain point when the religious expression
of one, as a government employee, triggers the prohibition on
government endorsement designed to protect the religious beliefs
of all. That being said, the courts have explained that a
compelling government interest is required to prohibit religious
activity by the government.230 In Widmar, the Supreme Court
clarified that observance of the Establishment Clause is a
compelling government interest.231 Therefore, a prohibition of
religious activity in the military workplace would not be
inherently invalid under free exercise as it would be in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, that is,
maintaining the Establishment Clause.
Moving to specific examples, when and to what extent is
public prayer appropriate in the military? Might one doubt the
constitutionality of an Air Force Network (“AFN”) commercial,
done by a Colonel military Chaplain, encouraging members to
“flex their faith muscles”? What prohibits a commander from
encouraging military members to read the New Testament? What
about a member encouraging another member to convert to
Christianity, or regularly citing scripture at work?
Prayer has received a great deal of coverage in this Article. If
the Mellen standard applies here, then, insofar as the military
employs “detailed regulation of conduct and the indoctrination of a
strict moral code,” prayer at mandatory military events is
inherently coercive.232 It, therefore, fails the Lemon test and,
further, is de jure coercive under the coercion test recommended
by Justice O’Connor233 and addressed by the Fourth Circuit in
229. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
230. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963).
231. 454 U.S. 263, 275 (1981).
232. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003); see also
Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
233. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 628–29 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment), abrogated by Town of
Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 44 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
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Mellen.234 However, consider the ramifications of these prayers
even without presumptive coerciveness. In an organization that
inserts religion into public events, imagine the ramifications when
all but a few members of the audience bow their heads in
observance of a prayer? Must an atheist military member negate
their views and observe the prayer or else chance the wrath of
their religious commander or supervisor? Even if not deemed de
jure coercive, it is indeed coercive-in-fact.
Under a free speech analysis, Greer clarifies that a military
base is not a public forum.235 Therefore, a compelling government
interest in limiting public prayer is not necessary. However, for
purposes of argument, this review will still utilize that higher
standard. In Widmar, the Court explained that a government
agency may pose no prohibition on content without demonstrating
that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serving a compelling
government interest.236 As stressed on multiple occasions, the
Court agreed that ensuring compliance with the Establishment
Clause is indeed a compelling government interest.237 Therefore,
insofar as prayer at mandatory military events is in violation of
the Establishment Clause, there is no free speech violation even
under the higher standard.
Professor Fitzkee comments:
Proselytizing violates the Establishment Clause if
military members are misusing their official position to
advance, favor, endorse, or coerce religion. This might
apply to members of the chain of command proselytizing
subordinates on duty or to service providers proselytizing
customers while providing a service.238
Clearly then, some private speech in the workplace is
prohibited by the Constitution. However, with all due respect to
Professor Fitzkee, the strict facts given in his example are not
necessary to fail the Lemon test. All that is required to be deemed
234. 327 F.3d at 365.
235. 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
236. 454 U.S. at 269–70.
237. Id. at 271.
238. Fitzkee, supra note 224, at 67; accord Fitzkee & Letendre, supra
note 9, at 30 (“The Establishment Clause is violated if it appears to the
reasonable observer that the government, through its employee’s speech, is
coercing or endorsing religion.”).
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unconstitutional is that a government actor, in this case at work
or in uniform, engages in activity which does not have a secular
purpose, or has the primary purpose of advancing or inhibiting
religion, or results in excessive government entanglement with
religion.239 Any individual proselytizing at work, leadership or
not, would appear to be in violation. Rank and position in the
military might only serve to extend the restriction outside of work.
Returning to the hypotheticals, a commander instructing his
subordinates to read the New Testament, in-and-of-itself appears
to fail all three elements of the Lemon test. Perhaps a scenario
similar to that found in Lynch v. Donnelly240 could help to explain
the situation. The commander could have encouraged members to
read sections of the New Testament and other secular and
religious texts as professional development insofar as they
implicate the tenets of leadership. However, minus extenuating
circumstances such as these, there is no secular purpose in such
an instruction. There is no purpose other than advancing religion.
This activity excessively involves the government in religion,
particularly considering the commander’s rank and position.
With regard to the AFN commercial, the argument, though
debatable, could be that there is a secular purpose for flexing one’s
faith muscles, that is, to ensure military readiness. However, the
primary purpose must be secular, which is not the case here. In
any case, the action has the obvious intended effect of advancing
religion. Placing the commercial on AFN creates the clear
impression of government entanglement with religion.
Encouraging other military members to convert to Christianity
poses an even clearer violation, particularly when encouraged by a
member of superior rank or position, thereby resulting in coercion.
Moving the analysis slightly, consider if a relatively low
ranking military member in a customer service-orientated field
answered every phone call with, “Jesus saves, how can I help
you?” What if a noncommissioned officer (“NCO”) did the same?
The unit commander? All of these actions would appear to fail the
Lemon test, and the higher the rank of the speaker, the more
likely the act is to qualify as coercion. Regular recitation of
scripture at work could result in the same issues. One step
239.
240.

See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
465 U.S. 668, 671–72 (1984).
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further into the gray, imagine that a low ranking member likes to
tell others in the office about the sermon he heard over the
weekend in the break room on Mondays or encourages colleagues
to attend Church. Now, what if an NCO did it? The commander?
While a little more difficult, again, it appears that somewhere the
Constitution has been violated. A prohibition on any of these
activities would not be deemed impermissible under free exercise
as there is a compelling interest in maintaining the Establishment
Clause.241
However, what about free speech analysis? In Connick, the
Court made it clear that in the public workplace, a court must
balance an individual’s interest in commenting on public concerns
against the government’s interest in conducting the public
services it performs.242 The former is subject to significant
limitation when the employee’s communication does not relate to a
matter of community concern.243 A commander’s belief in the
Bible is of personal, not community, concern. Proselytizing coworkers suffers from the same shortcoming.
Could such
proselytizing impact the “efficiency of the public services”244 that
the military performs? It certainly could. Is the singular opinion
of one, or few members, on his own religion or religious mandate
to spread the word “[a] matter of political, social, or other concern
to the community?”245 It is certainly not, unless we are, once and
for all to declare the United States a country of singular religious
background for which Americans are free to indoctrinate the
masses as they see fit. This is not without precedence. It is quite
common in many Middle Eastern countries.
The Islamic
Brotherhood would then find itself among rivals for religious
dominion of world governments. The type of close working
relationship described in Connick is inherent in most military
career fields. This fact is almost inevitable due to the military
hierarchy, where supervisors, first sergeants, and commanders
are involved with their members personal lives on a daily basis. It
is all the more so in deployed locations, where the court in Katcoff
has expressed perhaps the greatest need for the military
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).
Id. at 146.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 146.
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Chaplaincy.246
This is all supported by the case law on political speech. In
Mitchell, the Court clarified that being politically active, even in
one’s personal capacity, may be limited under the Constitution.247
How could it be constitutional to prohibit an individual from
soliciting votes for a candidate or speaking about partisan causes,
but not to prohibit them from soliciting votes for Allah or
discussing the position of the Gospels?
VII. CONCLUSION

In the era of the professional military, one must note that
most Fortune 500 companies are not beginning their events with
invocations and neither should the military.
It is easy,
particularly in a bureaucracy, to find solace in historical
consistency. A common theme in many areas of the military is
that tradition should be respected or, short of tradition, a certain
practice has always been conducted a particular way. The cases of
Katcoff, Engel, Lee, and Santa Fe all support the proposition that
“preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is
a responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere.”248
One thing is for certain: a cautioned approach to military prayer is
the most reasonable tack in order to avoid stumbling upon the
prohibitions of Lemon.
It is difficult to argue with the old adage, “if it ain’t broke,
don’t fix it.” However, with regard to religious practices in the
military, it is broken. It has been for some time. In fact, this
perhaps underscores the coercive nature of compliance, which is
inherent in the DoD, that there have not been more lawsuits for
religious practices therein. The military workplace applies the
social pressures acknowledged in school cases to an exponentially
greater extent, creating the very coercion feared in Lee.249 The
punishment for failure to conform in the military can put one’s
livelihood, and ultimately life, at risk. Due to these inherent
truths of military life, more so than other federal institutions, the

246. 755 F.2d 223, 228, 232 (2d Cir. 1985).
247. 330 U.S. 75, 103 (1947).
248. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310 (2000) (citing
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992)).
249. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
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military is likely falling afoul of even the more universally
accepted coercion case law.
Widmar stands for the proposition that complying with the
Establishment Clause is a sufficiently compelling government
interest.250 Connick acknowledges that free expression must be
balanced against the interest in effectively operating a public
office,251 and Mitchell, as well as United States Civil Service
Commission, has validated restrictions on speech similar to the
ones proposed here.252 Therefore, under any standard known to
law, prayers should be limited to actual religious events. Further,
at the least, commanders, NCOs, and military media
establishments should not be proselytizing, and peer proselytizing
should be kept outside of the workplace. Finally, repercussions
taken against a member for failure to adopt a “preferred” religious
practice should be eliminated with the utmost alacrity and
earnestness.

250. 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981).
251. 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).
252. U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO,
413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973); Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 82.

